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SLUMLORDISM AS A TORT-A BRIEF
RESPONSE
Joseph L. Sax*
Blum and Dunham begin their comment by accusing
us of having a new idea. We plead guilty. 1 Our purpose was to
demonstrate that accepted principles in analogous areas of law would
support a slumlordism action, not to argue that tort law as presently
applied would do so. Indeed, our basic intent was to underscore the
myopia of existing tort law perspectives.
They also charge us with creating a theory which might be used
by Mississippi Delta sharecroppers or braceros to attack the "appalling" (their word) situation in which they live; or by those who have
been cheated by unscrupulous merchants. We plead guilty again, this
time with enthusiasm. 2
They balk at a theory that affords a remedy to one subjected to
illegally substandard housing if previously he lived in a worse rural
dwelling. Their notion seems to be that one who has had "conditioning to a submerged status"3 cannot undergo serious harm from
subjection to slum life. It is not apparent how they would define
harm, or humiliation, as they call it, but if they think the inhabitants
of our urban ghettos are not filled with outrage against slumlords and
their fellow mercantilists, or that they are somehow immunized
against indignity, 4 some field research is recommended during the
next long, hot summer. The same must be said of their implication
that today's urban slumdwellers are only at a temporary way station
on the road to some middle-class Valhalla. The culture-of-poverty
literature is precisely to the opposite effect, as we expressly noted.5
They ask how we would distinguish the case of landlords who are
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I. Indeed, we have done so already; our article expressly noted "that in many ways
ours is a radical proposal ••• asking the courts to recognize a new tort or at least a
much altered form of a traditional tort." 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 921 (1967).
2. Where Blum and Dunham got the notion that our proposal was "limited to slumlordism in urban slums" we do not know. Our article was written as a detailed application of a general theory to one pressing social problem; it was an illustration rather
than a limitation.
3. 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 882 n.64 (1967).
4. Cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936): "It is interesting to note that
in his testimony with reference to the whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in
response to the inquiry as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, 'Not too
much for a Negro.' "
5. 65 MicH. L. REv. 869, 902 n.126 (1967).
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not economically motivated but who "make [housing] available free,
as a gift." 6 While this would hardly appear to be a problem of mammoth proportions, if they are worried about it, we shall let all such
philanthropists slip out of our net.
They also wonder whether the landlord could "purchase the
consent of tenants to suffer indignities." We thought it was clear
beyond dispute that a central purpose of having housing codes
was to assure that landlords could not utilize their dominant economic position to exact acquiesence in living conditions below minimal standards of decency. It hardly seems likely that low income
tenants are yearning to make such agreements on their own initiative.
The most puzzling of their objections is the fear that neither a
jury (which, they say, embodies "the social conventions of randomly
selected citizens") nor a judge ("from the sanctuary of his middle
income status") will be able to identify a seriously dilapidated building when they see one. No doubt juries and judges have their problems, but why those problems should suddenly seem insuperable
now-and in this particular setting-is difficult to understand. All
through history courts and juries have passed on cases of incredible
complexity, from railroad reorganizations to drug rites among the
Indians; they have had to decide what arouses prurient interests
and to give content to every abstract concept from sanity, due process,
and gross negligence to ordinary and necessary business expensesyet we are asked to worry that they will not be able to identify a slum
dwelling. I think we can rest confidently in the expectation that
garbage, rats, and leaking roofs will adequately speak for themselves.
Professors Blum and Dunham are also troubled by our view that
one who undertakes to perform a service to advance his own economic interests may be culpable if the service is inadequate. We
used as an example the doctor who provides insufficient treatment
in order to save him.self money, distinguishing that situation from
the doctor who merely declines to act as the good samaritan. They
assert that the medical analogy is inapposite because a special duty of
care has always attached to that profession. This is simply not responsive to our argument, We did not ask that the law apply to a
landlord the standards of care of the medical profession. We merely
ask that the law hold the landlord to the standards of his profession,
which the law already imposes upon him-that is, compliance with
the housing codes.
6. 66
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They ask how we are to know when a landlord has a defense. We
think this is rather easily answered. I£ the landlord can demonstrate
that, despite his attempts to meet code requirements, any of the
tenants in the building undermine his efforts by their own misconduct, we would give him a defense, not expecting him to do more
than make a reasonable effort toward code compliance. 7 Blum and
Dunham think that, under such a test, the landlord would prevail in
almost every case. We have rather more faith in the tenants and their
ability to organize for common benefit. We could be wrong, but we
ask only that this proposition be tested in application, not in theory.
Much of the remainder of their comment is given over to speculation. How do we know that landlords will not purposely select
tenants who are likely to harm the building, in order to avoid future
liability? Or that they will not avoid renting to poor people, or that
verdicts will not be excessive? Or that landlords will not find ways
to become judgment proof? Or that retroactivity problems will not
prove unmanageable? We don't, any more than we knew that abolition of the fellow-servant rule or the privity requirement or the
development of products liability would not promote intolerably
adverse consequences on business. Theirs is simply the argument for
never changing anything, for one can never issue a certificate of
assurance about the future. We think we have made at least a prima
fade case for our proposal. Under such circumstances, one who
wishes to argue the impropriety of a new approach to a concededly
serious problem has the responsibility to adduce some specific evidence to support his doubts; otherwise, the status quo becomes
frozen by the very fact that it is the status quo, since any change
could be for the worse.
Blum and Dunham's concern that the tort action may actually
reduce the stock of low cost housing misconceives the central point of
our article. We are not out to reform the landlord (who, we agree,
cannot afford to provide standard housing for the poor); we seek to
create a pressure situation leading to additional legislative subsidization of low cost housing. Dislocation of the present housing situation, which is comfortable enough for the slum landlord, is the
means for creating that pressure. We recognized in our article that
such dislocation involves risks for the tenants, and we only sought to
give them the opportunity to decide whether the present housing
situation is bad enough to make it worth taking that risk; we hold
7. Naturally such a defense would not be available to a landlord who hired a tenant
to undermine tenant organizing efforts.
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to the view that this is a decision tenants ought to be permitted to
make for themselves.
The receivership notion must also confront the unprofitability of
providing standard quality housing for the very poor. Of course one
can put a building in receivership, acquire money for rehabilitation,
and then substantially increase the rents. No doubt, as Blum and
Dunham note, one can even acquire private investment funds for
such a project. But-other than government financed demonstration
projects-how many seriously dilapidated buildings housing the very
poor have been put in receivership, rehabilitated up to standard, and
then re-rented at prices which the previous tenants could afford?
That is the real test of a receivership program, and we are still waiting for those statistics.

